The Dominant Economic Discourse of Today’s Iran in Retrospect

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Introduction

For the last century, contemporary Iranian economists have considered western economic thought as an archive of systems of ideas. Different generations of Iranian scientific community have permanently used western economic thought all along to understand and explain Iranian economic life. The result of such cultivation was the formation of various economic discourses, the historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects, determining the problems and subject-matters of which the scientific community speaks, paving the way to voice some statements, suffocating some other statements to be posed, thereby structuring the domain and form of the intellectual debate [Howarth 2000, 9; and Foucault 1972, 49].

Having been embryonically transmitted from the West since the early 1960s, the dominant economic discourse finally produced a doctrine about the health of economic research in the Iranian scientific community during 1990s. This doctrine defines the proper formulation of problems, the suitable method to inquire into economic life, the admissible language to articulate economic thinking, the effective interaction between economics and other sciences and, in short, the normal manners of economic researchers. All these canons – based on a very complex network of power diffusion – enforce themselves on the structure of the economic research and educational institutions, thereby prizing mainstream economics above heterodox economics and, perhaps even more, marginalizing the latter so strongly that there is little space left for formation, growth, and maturation of any kind of heterodox economics. The result is that a large part of the archive of economic thought is non-accessible to the scientific community in today’s Iran, a state that has led to a simplistic hegemony of orthodox economics, which is largely based on neoclassical microeconomics, mainstream macroeconomics, mathematical economics, and econometrics.

What has been said raises three strategic questions as the necessary elements of any counter-hegemonic project: firstly, how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, has the dominant economic discourse been introduced and established in the Iranian scientific community since the early 1960s? Secondly, on the basis of what mechanisms did the dominant economic discourse has achieved a hegemonic position in the Iranian scientific community since the early 1990s? Thirdly, how does the dominant economic discourse prevent the formation, growth, and maturation of alternative economic discourses? To set the stage for answering these questions, it is useful to appeal to a historical framework of development and expansion of economics in contemporary Iran. Such is the reason why we must return to more or less a century ago, even though the interest here is not so much a blind historiographical perspective as a problem-centered and present-oriented attitude.
The Embryo Stage of Economic Thought in Iran

As far as the Iranians’ vivid awareness of the western modern economic thought is concerned, the pre-late-Nasirean Age (1855-1895) can be recalled as the age of the silence. 1 Iranians first acquainted themselves with modern economic thought just a few years before the Constitutional Movement (1906), which was accompanied by the first wave of the Iranian intellectuals being extremely influenced by the western world. Not surprisingly, at the time, some intellectuals and courtly elites were eyeing the modern science without noting its theoretical principles and methodological foundations. Throughout the first intellectual wave with such pioneers as Mirza Malkam Khan (1831-1908), Akhund Zadeh (1809-1887), and Talebof (1832-1910), the economic controversy was less loudly voiced than the social and political criticism. Apart from a few handwritten books which were based on the general economic wisdom, Sismonde de Sismondi’s *Nouveaux Principes d’ Economie Politique* (1819) was the first western economics book to be translated into Persian around 1882 by Jules Richard (1816-1891), in Iran known as Rishar Khan, a completely free translation in which the industrial and commercial society had been strongly criticized.

The second generation of Iranian intellectuals concerned themselves much more with economic thought. In 1899, they established the Political Sciences School (*Madresey-e Uloum-e Siasi*), a forerunner of today’s economics faculties in Iran. Mohammad Ali Foruqi (1878-1942), a well-known writer and the then Prime Minister, provided the first economic textbook in 1905, a Persian translation of a French textbook by the Parisian liberal economist Paul Beauregard (1853-1919) [Haney 1964, 848-9]. Generally speaking, although several written or translated books in handwritten or published form were available during the late Nasirean Age to the 1930s, 2 the burden of economic debate was carried out by only few newspapers. Before the 1930s, economic writers and translators were indeed educated young men facing the general backwardness of the country after returning from the West to their homeland. They were working in various areas, from politics to literature, and the proportion of economic thought to them was not considerable. Generally speaking, this was the situation of economic thought when the University of Tehran, the first great university in contemporary Iran, was established in 1934: several economics books, either handwritten or published, either written or translated; some references to economic issues in non-economic literature; the occasional pieces in the papers about the day-to-day economic problems; the reliance on the economic common wisdom to face economic problems; the lack of opportunity and ability to adapt the contemporary economic lessons to the specific Iranian economic life; and, in short, the journalistic perception of economics.

The Childhood Stage of Economic Thought in Iran

Established in 1934, the University of Tehran’s Faculty of Law, Political and Economic Sciences – this inheritor of the Political Sciences School – gradually paved the way for the development of the teaching of economics in Iran. Apart from a few state institutions such as Iran’s National Bank (Bank Melli, established in 1927) and Plan Organization, the main role of economics was its educational functions and was limited to teaching in university before the 1960s. In this period, students could study economics at the faculty, “using a curriculum resembling that
of the French universities in the early decades of the twentieth century,” perhaps partly because “the first group of Iranian professors having studied in France in the 1930s and 1940s” [Behdad 1995, 195]. In the course of this period, the valuable but occasional efforts were made to transmit a diverse but limited spectrum of economic thought from the West to the country by a few numbers of educated Iranians, even though no dominant economic thought had began to form.

At the margin of this academic economic thought, the role of the Left as an underground political movement must be noted. The point of departure of the Iranian left groups was the introduction of social democratic ideas into the country in the course of the Constitutional Movement. The Iranian left was followed by the formation of Iran’s Communist Party in 1920 and later on by the so-called ‘Fifty-three’ Group (Gorouh-e Panjah-o Se Nafar) during the late First Pahlavi Reign (1937-1941). Upon the fall of Reza Shah’s dictatorship (1941), the Tudeh Party formed and gradually became an influential political party as well as an unfortunate mastermind of a Stalinist deviation. A few exceptions aside, both Tudeh Party and its separated groups were generally trying to promote the Marxist-Leninist approach, an approach which had a highly political attractiveness in Iran despite its pale economic thought. The significance of this political stream with all of its accessories arises from the fact that the intellectual leftist currents of the subsequent periods were somehow its scions despite their contrary behavior. Nevertheless, neither the academic economic thought nor this, sometimes underground and sometimes openly leftist, political stream was dominant in the intellectual scene before the early 1960s.

Enter the Dominant Economic Discourse into the Scene

The present position of economics in today’s Iran has its origin in the early 1960s and the succeeding decades. With the aim of an historical periodization, the 1960s and 1970s can be considered as a very different period from its preceding and succeeding periods. The two different intellectual spectrums were formed during this period: the radical approach and the conservative approach.

The radical approach indeed encompassed a wide spectrum of leftist opinions which was tied to the armed struggle of the organizational leftists against the Pahlavi Regime as a symbol of capitalism on the one hand and with some repressed political economists in academia on the other hand. The various organizational leftists saw political economy as an instrument for armed struggle against both world capitalism as imperialism and the established regime as an incarnation of capitalism, and the umbilical cord of these leftists was connected with Russian Marxism, Chinese Marxism, and Latin American Marxism. At the same time, radical political economists in universities, in spite of vigorous political obstacles that faced them, relied on an anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic attitude, based on the dependency school as their key intellectual source. Among their main research subjects, one can mention explaining the long-term trajectories of capitalism, understanding the nature of capitalism, and discovering the contradictions of capitalism, in a similar way as their contemporary counterparts around the world. The radical political economist was constantly faced with the severe police state; for example, as once a writer put it, “they would also have to camouflage forbidden terminology. For example, ‘group’ (guruh) would be used for ‘class’ (tabaqeh), ‘market system’ (nezam-e bazaar) for ‘capitalism’ (kapitalizm), ‘planned economy’ (eqtesad barnameh) for ‘socialism’
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(susializm), ‘benefiting’ (bahregiri) for ‘exploitation’ (bahrekeshi or estesmar), ‘employees’ (karkunan or huquqbegiran) for ‘workers’ (kargaran), ‘manager’ (mudir) or ‘entrepreneur’ (karfarma) for ‘capitalist’ (kapitalist), and so on” [Behdad 1995, 197]. Among the leftist contributions to economic thought, a series of interdisciplinary studies held a unique position. These studies – which were common product of political economy, history, historical sociology, and economic history – started to form during the late 1960s, and were the best fruits of the left tradition; a series of Iranian studies which concentrated on such questions as: is modern Iran a developed form of capitalism? Or, on the contrary, is it a traditional system in the process of shedding its feudal remnants and moving towards the purer form of modern capitalism? What are historical obstacles to the development of a bourgeoisie in Iran? Although these various leftist currents, in the form of Marxist asphyxia, had encompassed the intellectual community in the 1960s and 1970s, they were faced with political repression and a lot of political obstacles both in society and in the academic communities. One might say that, contrary to the 1990s, the repression of these streams had its origin in the political scene rather than the scientific community itself. As it will be seen, it was their tragic destiny in the 1980s and 1990s to be more or less violently marginalized by the academic communities. The stream that developed and stayed during the next decades, however, was their counter-current: the conservative approach.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the conservative stream developed the contemporary mainstream economics in the scientific community according to the western dominant economic thinking of the time, forming both a more or less new content of economics and a modern structure of economic research and educational institutions, initiating and amplifying the postgraduate courses in economics, increasing the number of economics departments and faculties, publishing the first scientific economic journal, setting up the first economic research institution, and, in short, starting to establish modern economics which is the embryo of the dominant economic discourse in today’s Iran.

The aim of the conservative current was to train specialists in order to do theoretical and applied research on world and Iranian economic issues. “The curriculum of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Tehran was devised in 1968 in consultation with John Hicks and Ursula Hicks, who visited Tehran for that purpose. The economics curriculum at the University of Tehran, like those at the National University and Pahlavi University, was based on the American model” [Behdad 1995, 195]. The economics of the time in Iran was gradually based on the four main pillars: neoclassical microeconomics of the time and its various related fields; Keynesian macroeconomics and its different connected fields; mathematical economics; and econometrics.

In this period, the curriculum chiefly encompassed the neoclassical-Keynesian approach. Nevertheless, the level of discussion among the conservative stream was not comparable to that of both its western counterpart and its subsequent generation. In the conservative research program, for example, although mathematical economics and econometrics were of great importance, none of those main pillars were taken seriously in both curriculum and research. Few courses in statistics, mathematical economics, and econometrics were offered in faculties. In a similar vein, throughout the 1960s, just three percent of the pages of the Quarterly Journal of Economic
Research (Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi), the first and most important economic journal in Iran, were allocated for papers, which had used mathematical economics techniques. Interestingly enough, none of papers of the journal used econometrics techniques in that same time period. The conservative stream largely rested on literary economics rather than math-oriented economics, and was mainly fed by the facts of Iranian economic life rather than economic techniques. In other words, the conservative stream was an essentially qualitative approach rather than quantitative approach. Hence, it seems that this stream was methodologically more pluralistic than its subsequent but more advanced economic discourse counterpart that was formed during the 1990s.

The conservative stream was basically unable to handle a powerful critical thinking. On the one hand, it essentially conflicted with the critical, albeit superficial, approaches toward mainstream economics, and on the other hand, it argued in favor of the economic policies of the time despite its disagreement with some political orientations of the Pahlavi Regime.

In spite of what has been said here about the conservative stream, the fact is that it was by no means a homogenous whole, but a heterogeneous one which was made up of various economists embarking upon a program of expansion of economic thought in Iran under a wide variety of mainstream economics of the time, even though it was at an enormous distance, both in quantity and in quality, from the original western economics. For the later argument of the present paper it is of considerable interest that although the conservative stream had a firm foothold in the formal body of universities throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it neither achieved a hegemonic position nor changed to a power relationship in the scientific community; therefore it did not suffocate and marginalize the alternative stream at all. Of course, as noted above, the repression of the radical stream continuously continued all the time, but the point here is that such a repression originated from the political scene of the country rather than the scientific community itself. There were still no monopolistic canons for the proper formulation of economic problems, suitable research method, admissible language articulating economic issues, effective interaction between economics and other sciences, and, in sum, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ manners of researchers. In other words, there was still no monopolistic power network to shape norms of educational and research conducted in the scientific community. Once the 1979 Revolution occurred, the scene was gradually shifted in favor of a completely new conservative generation. But the real story of this enormous change is more roundabout than has usually been thought. As a matter of fact, the political events that took place after the revolution had a decisive impact on the domain and form of economic discourse during the 1980s and 1990s.

The 1979 Revolution and its Impact on the Rise of New Conservative Discourse

The 1979 Revolution led to deep and immediate shifts in the social and political life of Iranian society. The unplanned and chaotic atmosphere of society had imposed itself on the universities during the late 1970s. The campuses had been converted into the hub of political activities in the wake of the revolution, full of all kinds of political groups. In such a disorder, all universities were closed on June 5, 1980 by an order from the Revolutionary Council. Considering a lot of revolutionaries as new authorities who had the desire for islamizing society as a whole, disguised as
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an Islamization of the academic system, the exclusion of intellectuals and opposition groups from campuses was the key justification for what the Council did. Such was the onset of the so-called Cultural Revolution. This was just the beginning.

Although the 1979 Revolution was a child of the alliance of various political currents against the Pahlavi Regime, it led to a political and ideological struggle in the wake of the victory, with both the political scene and academic arena as battlegrounds. Therefore, the complex political systems of exclusion and inclusion began to take form in both the arenas of politics and academia. The universities were finally reopened in 1983, even though there were really no universities as such in those three years. In the meanwhile, the various Marxist groups were gradually excluded from the political scene by a series of terrible struggles. In a similar way, the leftist economists also underwent an ideological cleansing. These events continuing for year after year gave the radical approach in academia the coup de grace once and for all, so that no manner of the radical approaches found a place in faculties of economics any longer. Some underground radical economists, who had escaped the vicious years, gradually moved into the intellectual community. A few years later, the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc in the world scene led many radical economists in the intellectual community to recede from Orthodox Marxism and turn their thoughts to social democratic ideas. The faculties of economics, of course, had no role in these changes perhaps because of the lack of radical economists in universities. But the story did not end there.

In a series of events called the Cultural Revolution, the radical economists were not the only current undergoing a cleansing campaign in universities. From then on, the universities were purged in someway or another so that only the ideologically tested and trusted Muslim group was allowed to attend academia, in a very similar way to the political scene of the time. The result of such policy was a deficiency of members of economics faculties though. There were few academicians in faculties immediately after the Cultural Revolution, either because of the Islamic cleansing and its subsequent dismissal of previous members, or because of the unfriendly milieu that resulted in intellectual migration. The shortage of academicians was a serious predicament solving outwardly through a rigorous recruitment of young educated Muslims from American universities. Thus the academic community underwent a premature generational change during a short stretch of time, a generational change that suddenly restructured economic thought in the Iranian scientific community. In other words, the new generation of young economists who should have gradually entered into the conservative stream suddenly became the most important spokesmen for the new conservative stream in academia. Furthermore, the selection of these newcomers was based on such criteria as fidelity to the revolutionary ideology, constructive activities for the revolution, friendly relations with the Islamic network of the country, good collaboration with the inchoate revolutionary organizations, and the like. Due to these criteria, the new economists in fact arose right in the center of the power structure and the establishment of the time. Hence, they could rapidly become such reliable persons for the Islamic Republic that they easily entered into the key centers of policy-making sooner or later. Such was the process through which a new conservative generation arrived on the scene. In fact, the shift in economic discourse in Iran from the 1960s and 1970s to the 1980s occurred rapidly over a few years as the leftist economists were purged by the new regime and the old conservative economists were discarded by the new unfriendly milieu on the one
The Newcomers’ Steps toward the Dominant Position

Slowly during the 1980s and rapidly during the 1990s, not only did the new academic economists wholly subjugate the educational and research centers in universities, but they also took the helm of all of the state research centers, having a key role in expanding the fourfold pillar of the mainstream economics, so that a dominant economic discourse was shaped among the scientific community in accordance with the conventional economics of the 1960s to the 1980s. In comparison with the old pre-revolution conservative stream, the academic newcomers rapidly developed the disciplines of microeconomics and macroeconomics as well as such courses as public economics, international economics, labor economics, managerial economics, resource economics, agricultural economics, and the like under conventional economics during the 1980s and 1990s, even though these courses were different in quantity and quality from the same courses in the first-rate American and European departments. They did their best to expand of mathematical economics and econometrics, so that such courses seemed the major ones in economics faculties in a short period. At the same time, some courses such as economic history, economic history of Iran, economic sociology, and economic anthropology were completely eliminated from the curriculum, and some courses such as history of economic thought, economic systems, and methodology of economics were regarded as less important and less relevant. Needless to say that the same was true for courses like sociology, anthropology, political science, history, philosophy and the like in undergraduate curriculum.

In graduate education, since then all the attention has been focused on technical skills that have completely overshadowed all other skills, so that a heavily quantitative approach has predominated within economics faculties. The evidence is, for example, the rise in the proportion of articles in the journal of Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi, one of the most important economic journals in Iranian universities that used no more than 4% of algebra and geometry in the 1960s and 26% in the 1970s to around 55% in the 1980s and 71% in 1990s. In the same manner, the proportion of articles in the journal that used econometrics models rose from no more than 7% in the 1970s to around 58% in the 1990s. This change signals a very quantitatively oriented approach as well as “a different mode of arguing or a different rhetoric” in the 1990s [Backhouse 1998, 1848]. The same changes occurred in other academic journals, the content of doctorate dissertations, and economic research of academic centers in less than two decades. In any case, although the new conservative economists changed the content of economics in universities, they did not launch a change in the structure of the university itself except a strategic variation in the relation of the university to both state research centers and policy-making centers.

Since the new conservative economists had wholly settled in the policymaking hubs, the demand of policymakers for quantitative answers led them, on the one hand, to gravitate toward a heavily quantitative economics and, on the other hand, to manage the research activities in universities in such a way that only such an economics was allowed to grow. The policy-making demands, thus, gradually made a reward and punishment macrosystem and many reward and punishment microsystems
in favor of conventional economics that were supported by the new conservative economists. Such a system of systems has also defined a doctrine about the health of economic research since the 1990s, a series of canons for determining the ‘normal’ manners of economic researcher. In fact, based on its control of the reward and punishment system, the new conservative stream inheriting the American conventional economics has been able to exercise its mental and intellectual leadership among the scientific community since the early 1990s.

The Dominant Economic Discourse as a Monopolistic Identity

As a matter of fact, the point here is not the scientific canons being imposed by the new conservative stream, but their monopolistic character. The new conservative stream holds that the language of scientific discourse is the only admissible language of economic science. Indeed, “each symbolic language has its own codes and conventions in communication,” and “in scientific literature as in all other forms of symbolic language, there are stylistic codes, rules of expression and codes of truth” [Ingrao 2001, 7]. But, this stream does not acknowledge the “radical diversity in codes and purposes of expression, in values and criteria of truth” [Ingrao 2001, 8], and hence it believes in mathematical modeling as the language of scientific discourse **par excellence**. For this reason, the use of such mathematical techniques as geometry, algebra, set theory, and topology is assumed as the top priority of the discipline. Due to this monopolistic belief, many economic questions in the Iranian economy have really disappeared into thin air. If what is today literally called economics has a derogatory meaning, it is indeed due to this belief. That is its firm belief in mathematical modeling as a language. The new conservative stream believes, however, in model-building methodology as a method. It holds that “the use of an agreed set of methods for the solution of certain types of problem” is the only suitable method to inquire into economic life [Backhouse 1998, 1848]. Based upon this belief, “the use of optimizing models of behaviour – whether the optimization is of utility or profit, or take account of phenomena such as transaction costs or imperfect information – and use of probabilistic models and Neymann-Pearson hypothesis testing” are prized above other method such as case studies, participant observation, discourse analysis and the like [Backhouse 1998, 1849]. “Observation of phenomena from different vantage points using data-gathering techniques may offer new insights into phenomena and enhance our understanding of them” [PAE 2001]. But, it seems that the scientific community in Iran has completely closed its members’ minds to the other methods. Interestingly enough, just due to this chronic closeness, the empirical sides such as the functioning of institutions, historical facts, survey of agents’ opinions, study of their strategies, and such like have all been neglected on the whole. Furthermore, the new conservative stream maintains that the mainstream theoretical framework to formulate economic problems is the only body of theory that is worthy of attention. Hence, some schools of thought such as Marxism, Institutionalism, Social Economics, and even the Austrian school, which are most alive among heterodox economists in Iran, are usually disregarded, with the result that we see, on the one hand, the increasing frequency of standard research and, on the other hand, the increasing paucity of heterodox research in the scientific community. Last but not least, the new conservative stream chose to stress the relationship between economics and mathematics rather than the relationship between economics and other social sciences. Therefore, the standard economists have all but no interdisciplinary dialogue with other social scientists, a key component of the dominant discourse in Iran that
has so strongly overshadowed economic research and education that orthodox scholars usually close their minds to other social sciences and do not recognize insights from sociology, politics, history, psychology, law, and philosophy.

The new conservative stream leaning upon its reward and punishment system defines the above-mentioned canons (i.e. mathematical modeling as a only admissible language to articulate economic thinking, model-building as a sole suitable method to inquire into economic life, mainstream theoretical framework as a unique viewpoint to formulate economic problems, and a math-oriented approach as the most effective interdisciplinary dialogue between economics and other sciences), enforcing them on the economic research and educational manners of researchers in such a way that if scholars want to resort to alternative canons, they have to bear some social or economic costs. The reward and punishment system ceaselessly signals practitioners to orient their research and educational manners toward those monopolistic canons. The reward and punishment system is strongly activated in such stages as evaluation of economics student, to allow student to enter graduate education, to pass proposal for doctorate dissertation, to hire new members at economics departments and research centers, to publish in academic journals, to pass research projects in the state research centers, and so on. All these stages as the powerful mediums of orthodoxy propagation have a decisive role in the academic and social position of scholars in the scientific community, and make a structured social force in favor of the mainstream economics’ durability. Therefore, one can see a complicated network of social power today originating from the scientific community itself, a network of social power that did not exist at all in the 1960s and 1970s. Fed by the dominant orthodox economics in the West as well as some complicated and decisive events in Iran herself, such power relations favoring orthodox economics in the Iranian scientific community have their origins in the 1980s and fully developed in the 1990s.

The Current Scene at a Glance

Therefore, the dominant economic discourse in Iran is, on the one hand, a heterogeneous system of meanings, concepts, and methods and, on the other hand, the economic research and educational structures that consists of not only a set of linguistic forms but also a system of power relations in the Iranian scientific community. It seems that these power relations are central to any analysis of the present position and prospects of economics in Iran. It is of considerable importance to understand how power operates and defines the rhetoric of exclusion. Of course, power is a ubiquitous relation and cannot be thought of as a dual division between the dominating and the dominated. But at the same time, these power relations have devised a system of exclusions involving alternative schools of thought, dissident scholars, avant-garde books, and progressive non-academic journals, which serve as focal points for heterodox thought. For example, dissident scholars are usually attacked by such ways as withdrawal of research grants, denial of tenure, ostracism by colleagues, transfer to different jobs, and other forms of suppression. The other side of the coin is a system of inclusions involving mainstream economic thought, conservative practitioners, standard books, and academic journals, which serve as pillars of orthodox economics. Such a system of exclusions and inclusions originating from reward and punishment system as a medium of power relations prizes orthodox economics above all kind of heterodox economics in such a way that there is less chance for marginalized heterodox economics to rise, grow, and mature in the
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scientific community. The result is nothing but the non-accessibility of very much of the archive of economic thought in today’s Iran, a component of the present position of economics that gives rise to a simplistic hegemony of orthodox economics in the country. It seems that this monopoly in Iran’s marketplace of ideas has its origin in the dominance of orthodox economics in the West as well as in the social structures of the Iranian scientific community itself.

Notes

1. Of course, Hosseini criticizes the Schumpeterian ‘Great Gap’ thesis because “this ‘Great Gap’ in economic thought … coincides with the Islamic golden age, when various Muslims writers made substantial contributions in various fields of enquiry, including economic matters…. The contributions of medieval Muslim writers and this [their] impact on Christian scholasticism should be regarded as a refutation of the Schumpeterian Great Gap thesis…. A great many medieval Islamic contributions to economic analysis… were made by Persian-speaking Iranian writers…. ” And later he demonstrates that “these Persian writers… were able to understand and to a remarkable degree analyze the economic realities of their age.” See Hamid Hosseini (1996, pp. 63-82). It is obvious that what Hosseini says is one thing and what is claimed in this paper is wholly another. The interest here is not the ‘Persian’ economic tradition, but just the ‘western’ economic thought. It seems that there is a difference between the old ‘Persian’ tradition and the western economics, and the latter has been developed in the contemporary Iran irrespective of the former.

2. The most important among these are: Seyed Jamalo’din Vaez Esfehani (1900); Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh (1917). As Bozorg Alavi says, the latter was a series of articles that was published in a Persian journal, Kaveh, in Berlin and then published in the form of a book in the same city in 1917. See also Alavi (1998, p. 96).

3. As Abrahamian writes, some examples of such writings are: E. Eshaq (1946), A. Ansari (1949), D. Nava’in (1948), M. Farnai, (1946), M. Kaveh (1948), and M. Babak (1948). See also Abrahamian (1982).

4. Such a nomenclature is depends on how each current took a position toward capitalism system.

5. Maziar Behrooz Writes: “Based on research done in the 1960s, the Fadaian [one of these political groups] also produced a number of studies on the land and reform in Iran which were the only in-depth works of their kind by Iranian Marxists.” See for example, the Rural Studies Series (1973a, 1973b, 1978a, and 1978b). See also Behrooz (1999). It seems that Behrooz completely neglects the academic Marxist studies when he speaks to “works of… Iranian Marxists.”

6. See, for example, Farhad Nomani (1973, and 1975). The former was an edited volume that included some articles by E. K. Hunt, Maurice Dobb, and Oskar Lange, and the latter consisted of some articles by Paul Baran, Maurice Dobb, Oskar Lange, and Farhad Nomani himself.

7. Among these were Ahmad Ashraf (1975), Farhad Nomani (1972), Farhad Nomani (1979), and Homa Katouzian (1981). Interestingly enough, nowadays the scientific community does not regard this kind of studies as
economic work. Among such new works are Abbas Vali (1993) and John Foran (1993).

References


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