This is evidently a much more extreme position than the modest claim, surely acceptable to everyone, that certain texts have social and historical--sometimes even political--resonance. Traditional literary history has, of course, never prohibited the investigation of such topics as the Florentine political background in Dante, Milton's relationship to the schismatics, or Irish historical allusions in Joyce. I would argue, however, that such information--even where it is not recontained, as it is in most instances, by an idealistic conception of the history of ideas--does not yield interpretation as such, but rather at best its (indispensable) preconditions.
Today this properly antiquarian relationship to the cultural past has a dialectical counterpart which is ultimately no more satisfactory; I mean the tendency of much contemporary theory to rewrite selected texts from the past in terms of its own aesthetic and, in particular, in terms of a modernist (or more properly post-modernist) conception of language. I have shown elsewhere (1) the ways in which such "ideologies of the text" construct a straw man or inessential term--variously called the "readerly" or the "realistic" or the "referential" text--over against which the essential term--the "writerly" or modernist or "open" text, ecriture or textual productivity--is defined and with which it is seen as a decisive break, But Croce's great dictum that "all history is contemporary history" does not mean that all history is our contemporary history; and the problems begin when your epistemological break begins to displace itself in time according to your own current interests, so that Balzac may stand for unenlightened representationality when you are concerned to bring out everything that is "textual" and modern in Flaubert, but turns into something else when, with Roland Barthes in S/Z, you have decided to rewrite Balzac as Philippe Sellers, as sheer text and ecriture.
This unacceptable option, or ideological double bind, between antiquarianism and modernizing "relevance" or projection demonstrates that the old dilemmas of historicism--and in particular, the question of the claims of monuments from distant and even archaic moments of the cultural past on a culturally different present (2)--do not go away just because we choose to ignore them. Our presupposition, in the analyses that follow, will be that only a genuine philosophy of history is capable of respecting the specificity and radical difference of the social and cultural past while disclosing the solidarity of its polemics and passions, its forms, structures, experiences, and struggles, with those of the present day.
But genuine philosophies of history have never been numerous, and few
survive in workable, usable form in the contemporary
world of consumer capitalism and the multinational system. We will have enough occasion, in the pages that follow, to emphasize the methodological interest of Christian historicism and the theological origins of the first great hermeneutic system in theWestern tradition, to be permitted the additional observation that the Chnstian philosophy of history which emerges full blown in Augustine's City of God (A.D. 413-26) can no longer be particularly binding on us. As for the philosophy of history of a heroic bourgeoisie, its two principal variants--the vision of progress that emerges from the ideological struggles of the French Enlightenment, and that organic populism or nationalism which articulated the rather different historicity of the central and Eastern European peoples and which is generally associated with the name of Herder--are neither of them extinct, certainly, but are at the very least both discredited under their hegemonic embodiments in positivism and classical liberalism, and in nationalism respectively.
My position here is that only Marxism offers a philosophically coherent and ideologically compelling resolution to the dilemma of historicism evoked above. Only Marxism can give us an adequate account of the essential mystery of the cultural past, which, like Tiresias drinking the blood, is momentarily returned to life and warmth and allowed once more to speak, and to deliver its long-forgotten message in surroundings utterly alien to it. This mystery can be reenacted only if the human adventure is one; only thus--and not through the hobbies of antiquarianism or the projections of the modernists--can we glimpse the vital claims upon us of such long-dead issues as the seasonal alternation of the economy of a primitive tribe, the passionate disputes about the nature of the Trinity, the conflicting models of the polis or the universal Empire, or, apparently closer to us in time, the dusty parliamentary and journalistic polemics of the nineteenth-century nation states. These matters can recover their original urgency for us only if they are retold within the unity of a single great collective story; only if, in however disguised and symbolic a form, they are seen as sharing a single fundamental theme--for Marxism, the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of Necessity; (3) only if they are grasped as vital episodes in a single vast unfinished plot: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles: freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman--in a word, oppressor and oppressed--stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes." (4) It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its necessity.
From this perspective the convenient working distinction between cultural texts that are social and political and those that are not becomes something worse than an error: namely, a symptom and a reinforcement of the reification and privatization of contemporary life. Such a distinction reconfirms that structural, experiential, and conceptual gap between the public and the private, between the social and the psychological, or the political and the poetic, between history or society and the "individual," which--the tendential law of social life under capitalism--maims our existence as individual subjects and paralyzes our thinking about time and change just as surely as it alienates us from our speech itself. To imagine that, sheltered from the omnipresence of history and the implacable influence of the social, there already exists a realm of freedom--whether it be that of the microscopic experience of words in a text or the ecstasies and intensities of the various private religions--is only to strengthen the grip of Necessity over all such blind zones in which the individual subject seeks refuge, in pursuit of a purely individual, a merely psychological, project of salvation. The only effective liberation from such constraint begins with the recognition that there is nothing that is not social and historical-- indeed, that everything is "in the last analysis" political.
The assertion of a political unconscious proposes that we undertake
just such a final analysis and explore the multiple paths that
lead to the unmasking of cultural artifacts as socially symbolic acts. It projects a rival hermeneutic to those already enumerated; but it does so, as we shall see, not so much by repudiating their findings as by arguing its ultimate philosophical and methodological priority over more specialized interpretive codes whose insights are strategically limited as much by their own situational origins as by the narrow or local ways in which they construe or construct their objects of study.
Still, to describe the readings and analyses contained in the present work as so many interpretations, to present them as so many exhibits in the construction of a new hermeneutic, is already to announce a whole polemic program, which must necessarily come to terms with a critical and theoretical climate variously hostile to these slogans. (5) It is, for instance, increasingly clear that hermeneutic or interpretive activity has become one of the basic polemic targets of contemporary post-structuralism in France, which--powerfully buttressed by the authority of Nietzsche--has tended to identify such operations with historicism, and in particular with the dialectic and its valorization of absence and the negative, its assertion of the necessity and priority of totalizing thought. I will agree with this identification, with this description of the ideological affinities and implications of the ideal of the interpretive or hermeneutic act; but I will argue that the critique is misplaced.
Indeed, one of the most dramatic of such recent attacks on interpretation--The
Anti-Oedipus, by Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari--quite properly takes as its object not Marxian, but rather Freudian, interpretation, which is characterized as a reduction and a rewriting of the whole rich and random multiple realities of concrete everyday experience into the contained, strategically pre-limited terms of the family narrative--whether this be seen as myth, Greek tragedy, "family romance," or even the Lacanian structural version of the Oedipus complex. What is denounced is therefore a system of allegorical interpretation in which the data of one narrative line are radically impoverished by their rewriting according to the paradigm of another narrative, which is taken as the former's master code or Ur-narrative and proposed as the ultimate hidden or unconscious meaning of the first one. The thrust of the argument of the Anti-Oedipus is, to be sure, very much in the spirit of the present work, for the concern of its authors is to reassert the specificity of the political content of everyday life and of individual fantasy-expenence and to reclaim it from that reduction to the merely subjective and to the status of psychological projection which is even more characteristic of American cultural and ideological life today than it is of a still politicized France. My point in mentioning this example is to observe that the repudiation of an older interpretive system--Freudian rewriting, overhastily assimilated to hermeneutics in general and as such--is in The Anti-Oedipus coupled with the projection of a whole new method for the
reading of texts:
[ . . . ]
At this point it might seem appropriate to juxtapose a Marxist method
of literary and cultural interpretation with those just outlined, and to
document its claims to greater adequacy and validity. For better
or for worse, however, as I warned in the Preface, this obvious next step
is not the strategy projected by the present book, which rather seeks to
argue the perspectives of Marxism as necessary preconditions for adequate
literary comprehension. Marxist critical insights will therefore here be
defended as something like an ultimate semantic precondition for
the intelligibility of literary and cultural texts. Even this argument,
however, needs a certain specification: in particular we will suggest that
such semantic enrichment and enlargement of the inert givens and materials
of a particular text must take place within three concentric frameworks,
which mark a widening out of the sense of the social ground of a text through
the notions, first, of political history, in the narrow sense of punctual
event and a chroniclelike sequence of happenings in time; then of society,
in the now already less diachronic and time-bound sense of a constitutive
tension and struggle between social classes; and, ultimately, of history
now conceived in its vastest sense of the
sequence of modes of production and the succession and destiny of the various human social formations, from prehistoric life to whatever far future history has in store for us. (56)
These distinct semantic horizons are, to be sure, also distinct moments
of the process of interpretation, and may in that sense be understood as
dialectical equivalents of what Frye has called the successive "phases"
in our reinterpretatlon--our rereading and
rewriting--of the literary text. What we must also note, however, is that each phase or horizon governs a distinct reconstruction of its object, and construes the very structure of what can now only in a general sense be called "the text" in a different way.
Thus, within the narrower limits of our first, narrowly political or historical, horizon, the "text,"' the object of study, is still more or less construed as coinciding with the individual literary work or utterance. The difference between the perspective enforced and enabled by this horizon, however, and that of ordinary explication de texte, or individual exegesis, is that here the individual work is grasped essentially as a symbolic act.
When we pass into the second phase, and find that the semantic horizon within which we grasp a cultural object has widened to include the social order, we will find that the very object of our analysis has itself been thereby dialectically transformed, and that it is no longer construed as an individual "text" or work in the narrow sense, but has been reconstituted in the form of the great collective and class discourses of which a text is little more than an individual parole or utterance. Within this new horizon, then, our object of study will prove to be the ideologeme, that is, the smallest intelligible unit of the essentially antagonistic collective discourses of social classes.
When finally, even the passions and values of a particular social formation find themselves placed in a new and seemingly relativized perspective by the ultimate horizon of human history as a whole, and by their respective positions in the whole complex sequence of the modes of production, both the individual text and its ideologemes know a final transformation, and must be read in terms of what I will call the ideology of form, that is, the symbolic messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production.
The general movement through these three progressively wider horizons
will largely coincide with the shifts in focus of the final
chapters in this book, and will be felt, although not narrowly and programmatically underscored, in the methodological transformations determined by the historical transformations of their textual objects, from Balzac to Gissing to Conrad.
We must now briefly characterize each of these semantic or interpretive
horizons. We have suggested that it is only in the first
narrowly political horizon--in which history is reduced to a series of punctual events and crises in time, to the diachronic agitation of the year-to-year, the chroniclelike annals of the rise and fall of political regimes and social fashions, and the passionate immediacy of struggles between historical individuals--that the "text" or object of study will tend to coincide with the individual literary work or cultural artifact. Yet to specify this individual text as a symbolic act is already fundamentally to transform the categories with which traditional explication de texte (whether narrative or poetic) operated and largely still operates.
The model for such an interpretive operation remains the readings of
myth and aesthetic structure of Claude Levi-Strauss as
they are codified in his fundamental essay "The Structural Study of Myth." (57) These suggestive, often sheerly occasional, readings and speculative glosses immediately impose a basic analytical or interpretive principle: the individual narrative, or the individual formal structure, is to be grasped as the imaginary resolution of a real contradiction. Thus, to take only the most dramatic of Levi-Strauss's analyses--the "interpretation" of the unique facial decorations of the Caduveo Indians--the starting point will be an immanent description of the formal and structural peculiarities of this body art; yet it must be a description already pre-prepared and oriented toward transcending the purely formalistic, a movement which is achieved not by abandoning the formal level for something extrinsic to it--such as some inertly social "content"--but rather immanently, by
construing purely formal patterns as a symbolic enactment of the social within the formal and the aesthetic. Such symbolic functions are, however, rarely found by an aimless enumeration of random formal and stylistic features; our discovery of a text's symbolic efficacity must be oriented by a formal description which seeks to grasp it as a determinate structure of still properly formal contradictions. Thus, Levi-Strauss orients his still purely visual analysis of Caduveo facial decorations toward this climactic account of their contradictory dynamic: "the use of a design which is symmetrical but yet lies across an oblique axis... a complicated situation based upon two contradictory forms of duality, and resulting in a compromise brought about by a secondary opposition between the ideal axis of the object itself [the human face] and the ideal axis of the figure which it represents." (58) Already on the purely formal level, then, this visual text has been grasped as a contradiction by way of the curiously provisional and asymmetrical resolution it proposes for that contradiction.
[ . . . ]
We have implied that in order to be consequent, the will to read literary
or cultural texts as symbolic acts must necessarily
grasp them as resolutions of determinate contradictions and it is clear that the notion of contradiction is central to any Marxist
cultural analysis, just as it will remain central in our two subsequent horizons, although it will there take rather different forms. The methodological requirement to articulate a text's fundamental contradiction may then be seen as a test of the completeness of the analysis: this is why, for example, the conventional sociology of literature or culture, which modestly limits itself to the identification of class motifs or values in a given text, and feels that its work is done when it shows how a given artifact "reflects" its social background, is utterly unacceptable. Meanwhile, Kenneth Burke's play of emphases, in which a symbolic act is on the one hand affirmed as a genuine act, albeit on the symbolic level, while on the other it is registered as an act which is "merely" symbolic, its resolutions imaginary ones that leave the real untouched, suitably dramatizes the ambiguous status of art and culture.
Still, we need to say a little more about the status of this external
reality, of which it will otherwise be thought that it is little more
than the traditional notion of "context" familiar in older social or historical criticism. The type of interpretation here proposed is
more satisfactorily grasped as the rewriting of the literary text in such a way that the latter may itself be seen as the rewriting or
restructuration of a prior historical or ideological subtext, it being always understood that that "subtext" is not immediately present as such, not some common-sense external reality, nor even the conventional narratives of history manuals, but rather must itself always be (re)constructed after the fact. The literary or aesthetic act therefore always entertains some active relationship with the Real; yet in order to do so, it cannot simply allow "reality" to persevere inertly in its own being, outside the text and at distance. It must rather draw the Real into its own texture, and the ultimate paradoxes and false problems of linguistics, and most notably of semantics, are to be traced back to this process, whereby language manages to carry the Real within itself as its own intrinsic or immanent subtext. Insofar, in other words, as symbolic action--what Burke will map as "dream," "prayer," or "chart" (60)--is a way of doing something to the world, to that degree what we are calling "world" must inhere within it, as the content it has to take up into itself in order to submit it to the transformations of form. The symbolic act therefore begins by generating and producing its own context in the same moment of emergence in which it steps back from it, taking its measure with a view toward its own projects of transformation. The whole paradox of what we have here called the
subtext may be summed up in this, that the literary work or cultural object, as though for the first time, brings into being that very situation to which it is also, at one and the same time, a reaction. It articulates its own situation and textualizes it, thereby encouraging and perpetuating the illusion that the situation itself did not exist before it, that there is nothing but a text, that there never was any extra- or con-textual reality before the text itself generated it in the form of a mirage. One does not have to argue the reality of history: necessity, like Dr. Johnson's stone, does that for us. That history--Althusser's "absent cause," Lacan's "Real"--is not a text, for it is fundamentally non-narrative and nonrepresentational; what can be added, however, is the proviso that history is inaccessible to us except in textual form, or in other words, that it can be approached only by way of prior (re)textualization. Thus, to insist on either of the two inseparable yet incommensurable dimensions of the symbolic act without the other: to overemphasize the active way in which the text reorganizes its subtext (in order, presumably, to reach the triumphant conclusion that the "referent" does not exist); or on the other hand to stress the imaginary status of the symbolic act so completely as to reify its social ground, now no longer understood as a subtext but merely as some inert given that the text passively or fantasmatically "reflects"--to overstress either of these functions of the symbolic act at the expense of the other is
surely to produce sheer ideology, whether it be, as in the first alternative, the ideology of structuralism, or, in the second, that of
Still, this view of the place of the "referent" will be neither complete
nor methodologically usable unless we specify a supplemen- tary distinction
between several types of subtext to be (re)constructed. We have implied,
indeed, that the social contradiction
addressed and "resolved" by the formal prestidigitation of narrative must, however reconstructed, remain an absent cause, which cannot be directly or immediately conceptualized by the text. It seems useful, therefore, to distinguish, from this ultimate subtext which is the place of social contradiction, a secondary one, which is more properly the place of ideology, and which takes the form of the aporia or the antinomy: what can in the former be resolved only through the intervention of praxis here comes before the purely contemplative mind as logical scandal or double bind, the unthinkable and the conceptually paradoxical, that which cannot be unknotted by the operation of pure thought, and which must therefore generate a whole more properly narrative apparatus--the text itself--to square its circles and to dispel, through narrative movement, its intolerable closure. Such a distinction, positing a system of antinomies as the symptomatic expression and conceptual reflex of something quite different, namely a social contradiction, will now allow us to reformulate that coordination between a semiotic and a dialectical method, which was evoked in the preceding section. The operational validity of semiotic analysis, and in particular of the Greimassian semiotic rectangle, (61) derives, as was suggested there, not from its adequacy to nature or being, nor even
from its capacity to map all forms of thinking or language, but rather from its vocation specifically to model ideological closure
and to articulate the workings of binary oppositions, here the privileged form of what we have called the antinomy. A dialectical reevaluation of the findings of semiotics intervenes, however, at the moment in which this entire system of ideological closure is taken as the symptomatic projection of something quite different, namely of social contradiction.
We may now leave this first textual or interpretive model behind, and
pass over into the second horizon, that of the social. The latter becomes
visible, and individual phenomena are revealed as social facts and institutions,
only at the moment in which the organizing categories of analysis become
those of social class. I have in another place described the dynamics of
ideology in its constituted form as a function of social class: (62)
suffice it only to recall here that for Marxism classes must always be
apprehended relationally, and that the ultimate (or ideal) form of class
relationship and class struggle is always dichotomous. The constitutive
form of class relationships is always that between a dominant and a laboring
class: and it is only in terms of this axis that class fractions (for example,
the petty bourgeoisie) or ec-centric or dependent classes (such as the
are positioned. To define class in this way is sharply to differentiate the Marxian model of classes from the conventional sociological analysis of society into strata, subgroups, professional elites and the like, each of which can presumably be studied in isolation from one another in such a way that the analysis of their "values" or their "cultural space" folds back into separate and independent Weltanschauungen, each of which inertly reflects its particular "stratum." For Marxism, however, the very content of a class ideology is relational, in the sense that its "values" are always actively in situation with respect to the opposing class, and defined against the latter: normally, a ruling class ideology will explore various strategies of the legitimation of its own power position, while an oppositional culture or ideology will, often in covert and disguised strategies, seek to contest and to undermine the dominant "value system."
This is the sense in which we will say, following Mikhail Bakhtin, that
within this horizon class discourse--the categories in
terms of which individual texts and cultural phenomena are now rewntten--is essentially dialogical in its structure. (63) As Bakhtin's (and Voloshinov's) own work in this field is relatively specialized, focusing primarily on the heterogeneous and explosive pluralism of moments of carnival or festival (moments, for example, such as the immense resurfacing of the whole spectrum of the religious or political sects in the English 1640s or the Soviet 1920s) it will be necessary to add the qualification that the normal form of the dialogical is essentially an antagonistic one, and that the dialogue of class struggle is one in which two opposing discourses fight it out within the general unity of a shared code. Thus, for instance, the shared master code of religion becomes in the 1640s in England the place in which the dominant formulations of a hegemonic theology are reappropriated and polemically modified. (64)
Within this new horizon, then, the basic formal requirement of dialectical
analysis is maintained, and its elements are still restruc-
tured in terms of contradiction (this is essentially, as we have said, what distinguishes the relationality of a Marxist class analysis from static analysis of the sociological type). Where the contradiction of the earlier horizon was univocal, however, and limited to the situation of the individual text, to the place of a purely individual symbolic resolution, contradiction here appears in the form of the dialogical as the irreconcilable demands and positions of antagonistic classes. Here again, then, the requirement to prolong interpretation to the point at which this ultimate contradiction begins to appear offers a criterion for the completeness or insufficiency of the analysis.
Yet to rewrite the individual text, the individual cultural artifact, in terms of the antagonistic dialogue of class voices is to perform a rather different operation from the one we have ascribed to our first horizon. Now the individual text will be refocused as a parole, or individual utterance, of that vaster system, or langue, of class discourse. The individual text retains its formal structure as a symbolic act: yet the value and character of such symbolic action are now significantly modified and enlarged. On this rewriting, the individual utterance or text is grasped as a symbolic move in an essentially polemic and strategic ideological confrontation between the classes, and to describe it in these terms (or to reveal it in this form) demands a whole set of different instruments.
For one thing, the illusion or appearance of isolation or autonomy which
a printed text projects must now be systematically
undermined. Indeed, since by definition the cultural monuments and masterworks that have survived tend necessarily to perpetuate only a single voice in this class dialogue, the voice of a hegemonic class, they cannot be properly assigned their relational place in a dialogical system without the restoration or artificial reconstruction of the voice to which they were initially opposed, a voice for the most part stifled and reduced to silence, marginalized, its own utterances scattered to the winds, or reappropriated in their turn by the hegemonic culture.
This is the framework in which the reconstruction of so-called popular cultures must properly take place--most notably, from the fragments of essentially peasant cultures: folk songs, fairy tales, popular festivals, occult or oppositional systems of belief such as magic and witchcraft. Such reconstruction is of a piece with the reaffirmation of the existence of marginalized or oppositional cultures in our own time, and the reaudition of the oppositional voices of black or ethnic cultures, women's and gay literature, "naive" or marginalized folk art, and the like. But once again, the affirmation of such nonhegemonic cultural voices remains ineffective if it is limited to the merely "sociological" perspective of the pluralistic rediscovery of other isolated social groups: only an ultimate rewriting of these utterances in terms of their essentially polemic and subversive strategies restores them to their proper place in the dialogical system of the social classes. Thus, for instance, Bloch's reading of the fairy tale, with its magical wish-fulfillments and its Utopian fantasies of plenty and the pays de Cocagne, (65) restores the dialogical and antagonistic content of this "form" by exhibiting it as a systematic deconstruction and undermining of the hegemonic aristocratic form of the epic, with its somber ideology of heroism and baleful destiny; thus also the work of Eugene Genovese on black religion restores the vitality of these utterances by reading them, not as the replication of imposed beliefs, but rather as a process whereby the hegemonic Christianity of the slave-owners is appropriated, secretly emptied of its content and subverted to the transmission of quite different oppositional and coded messages.(66)
Moreover, the stress on the dialogical then allows us to reread or rewrite
the hegemonic forms themselves; they also can be grasped as a process of
the reappropriation and neutralization, the cooptation and class transformation,
the cultural universalization, of forms which originally expressed
the situation of "popular," subordinate, or dominated groups. So the slave
religion of Christianity is transformed into the hegemonic ideological
apparatus of the medieval system; while folk music and peasant dance find
themselves transmuted into the forms of aristocratic or court festivity
and into the cultural visions of the pastoral; and popular narrative from
time immemorial--romance, adventure story, melodrama, and the like--is
ceaselessly drawn on to restore vitality to an enfeebled and asphyxiating
"high culture." Just so, in our own time, the vernacular and its still
vital sources of production (as in black language) are reappropriated by
the exhausted and media-standardized speech of
a hegemonic middle class. In the aesthetic realm, indeed, the process of cultural "universalization" (which implies the repression of the oppositional voice, and the illusion that there is only one genuine "culture") is the specific form taken by what can be called the process of legitimation in the realm of ideology and conceptual systems.
Still, this operation of rewriting and of the restoration of an essentially
dialogical or class horizon will not be complete until we
specify the "units" of this larger system. The linguistic metaphor (rewriting texts in terms of the opposition of a parole to a langue) cannot, in other words, be particularly fruitful until we are able to convey something of the dynamics proper to a class langue itself, which is evidently, in Saussure's sense, something like an ideal construct that is never wholly visible and never fully present in any one of its individual utterances. This larger class discourse can be said to be organized around minimal "units" which we will call ideologemes. The advantage of this formulation lies in its capacity to mediate between conceptions of ideology as abstract opinion, class value, and the like, and the narrative materials with which we will be working here. The ideologeme is an amphibious formation, whose essential structural characteristic may be described as its possibility to manifest itself either as a pseudoidea--a conceptual or belief system, an abstract value, an opinion or prejudice--or as a protonarrative, a kind of ultimate class fantasy about the "collective characters" which are the classes in opposition. This duality means that the basic requirement for the full description of the ideologeme is already given in advance: as a construct it must be susceptible to both a conceptual description and a narrative manifestation all at once. The ideologeme can of course be elaborated in
either of these directions, taking on the finished appearance of a philosophical system on the one hand, or that of a cultural text on the other; but the ideological analysis of these finished cultural products requires us to demonstrate each one as a complex work of transformation on that ultimate raw material which is the ideologeme in question. The analyst's work is thus first that of the identification of the ideologeme, and, in many cases, of its initial naming in instances where for whatever reason it had not yet been registered as such. The immense preparatory task of identifying and inventorying such ideologemes has scarcely even begun, and to it the present book will make but the most modest contribution: most notably in its isolation of that fundamental nineteenth-century ideologeme which is the "theory" of ressentiment, and in its "unmasking" of ethics and the ethical binary opposition of good and evil as one of the fundamental forms of ideological thought in Western culture. However, our stress here and throughout on the fundamentally narrative character of such ideologemes (even where they seem to be articulated only as abstract conceptual beliefs or values) will offer the advantage of restoring the complexity of the transactions between opinion and protonarrative or libidinal fantasy. Thus we will observe, in the case of Balzac, the generation of an overt and constituted ideological and political "value system" out of the operation of an essentially narrative and fantasy dynamic; the chapter on Gissing, on the other hand, will show how an already constituted "narrative paradigm" emits an ideological message in its own right without the mediation of authorial intervention.
This focus or horizon, that of class struggle and its antagonistic discourses,
is, as we have already suggested, not the ultimate form a Marxist analysis
of culture can take. The example just alluded to--that of the seventeenth-century
English revolution, in which the various classes and class fractions found
themselves obliged to articulate their ideological struggles through the
shared medium of a religious master code--can serve to dramatize the shift
whereby these objects of study are reconstituted into a structurally distinct
"text" specific to this final enlargement of the analytical frame. For
the possibility of a displacement in emphasis is already given in this
example: we have suggested that within the apparent unity of the theological
code, the fundamental difference of antagonistic class positions can be
made to emerge. In that case, the inverse move is also possible, and such
concrete semantic differences can on the contrary be focused in such a
way that what emerges is rather the
all-embracing unity of a single code which they must share and which thus characterizes the larger unity of the social system. This new object--code, sign system, or system of the production of signs and codes--thus becomes an index of an entity of study which greatly transcends those earlier ones of the narrowly political (the symbolic act), and the social (class discourse and the ideologeme), and which we have proposed to term the historical in the larger sense of this word. Here the organizing unity will be what the Marxian tradition designates as a mode of production.
I have already observed that the "problematic" of modes of production
is the most vital new area of Marxist theory in all the
disciplines today; not paradoxically, it is also one of the most traditional, and we must therefore, in a brief preliminary way, sketch in the "sequence" of modes of production as classical Marxism, from Marx and Engels to Stalin, tended to enumerate them. (67) These modes, or "stages" of human society, have traditionally included the following: primitive communism or tribal society (the horde), the gens or hierarchical kinship societies (neolithic society), the Asiatic mode of production (so-called Oriental despotism), the polis or an oligarchical slaveholding society (the ancient mode of production), feudalism, capitalism, and communism (with a good deal of debate as to whether the "transitional" stage between these last--sometimes called "socialism"-is a genuine mode of production in its own right or not). What is more significant in the present context is that even this schematic or mechanical conception of historical "stages" (what the Althusserians have systematically criticized under the term "historicism") includes the notion of a cultural dominant or form of ideological coding specific to each mode of production. Following the same order these have generally been conceived as magic and mythic narrative, kinship, religion or the sacred, "politics" according to the narrower category of citiizenship in the ancient city state, relations of personal domination, commodity reification, and (presumably) original and as yet nowhere fully developed forms of collective or communal association.
[ . . . ]
We must therefore now turn to the second related problem about this
third and ultimate horizon, and deal briefly with the objection that cultural
analysis pursued within it will tend toward a purely typological or classificatory
operation, in which we are called upon to "decide" such issues as whether
Milton is to be read within a "precapitalist" or a nascent capitalist context,
and so forth. I have insisted elsewhere on the sterility of such
classificatory procedures, which may always , it seems to me, be taken
as symptoms and indices of the repression of a more genuinely dialectical
or historical practice of cultural analysis. This diagnosis may now be
expanded to cover all three horizons at issue here, where the practice
of homology, that of a merely "sociological" search for some social or
class equivalent, and that, finally, of the use of some typology of social
and cultural systems, respectively, may stand as examples of the misuse
of these three frameworks. Furthermore, just as in our discussion of the
first two we have stressed the centrality of the category of contradiction
for any Marxist analysis (seen, within the first
horizon, as that which the cultural and ideological artifact tries to "resolve," and in the second as the nature of the social and class conflict within which a given work is one act or gesture), so too here we can effectively validate the horizon of the mode of production by showing the form contradiction takes on this level, and the relationship of the cultural obiect to it.
[ . . . ]
. . . We will therefore suggest that this new and ultimate object
may be designated, drawing on recent historical experience, as cultural
revolution, that moment in which the coexistence of various modes of
production becomes visibly antagonistic, their contradictions moving to
the very center of political, social, and historical life. The incomplete
Chinese experiment with a "proletarian" cultural revolution may be invoked
in support of the proposition that previous history has known a whole range
of equivalents for similar processes to which the term may legitimately
be extended. So the Western Enlightenment may be grasped as part
of a properly bourgeois cultural revolution, in which the values and the
discourses, the habits and the daily space, of the ancien regime
were systematically dismantled so that in their place could be set the
new conceptualities, habits and life forms, and value systems of a capitalist
market society. This process clearly involved a vaster historical rhythm
than such punctual historical events as the French Revolution or the Industrial
Revolution, and includes in its longue duree such phenomena as those
described by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism--a
work that can now in its
turn be read as a contribution to the study of the bourgeois cultural revolution, just as the corpus of work on romanticism is now re-positioned as the study of a significant and ambiguous moment in the resistance to this particular "great transformation," alongside the more specifically "popular" (precapitalist as well as working-class) forms of cultural resistance.
But if this is the case, then we must go further and suggest that all previous modes of production have been accompanied by cultural revolutions specific to them of which the neolithic "cultural revolution," say, the triumph of patriarchy over the older matriarchal or tribal forms, or the victory of Hellenic "justice" and the new legality of the polis over the vendetta system are only the most dramatic manifestations. The concept of cultural revolution, then--or more precisely, the reconstruction of the materials of cultural and literary history in the form of this new "text" or object of study which is cultural revolution--may be expected to project a whole new framework for the humanities, in which the study of culture in the widest sense could be placed on a materialist basis.
[ . . . ]
. . . Just as overt revolution is no punctual event either, but
brings to surface the innumerable daily struggles and
forms of class polarization which are at work in the whole course of social
life that precedes it, and which are therefore latent and implicit in "prerevolutionary"
social experience, made visible as the latter's deep structure only in
such "moments of truth"--so also the overtly "transitional" moments of
cultural revolution are themselves but the passage to the surface of a
permanent process in
human societies, of a permanent struggle between, the various coexisting modes of production. The triumphant moment in which a new systemic dominant gains ascendency is therefore only the diachronic manifestation of a constant struggle for the perpetuation and reproduction of its dominance, a struggle which must continue throughout its life course, accompanied at all moments by the systemic or structural antagonism of those older and newer modes of production that resist assimilation or seek deliverance from it. The task of cultural and social analysis thus construed within this final horizon will then clearly be the rewriting of its materials in such a way that this perpetual cultural revolution can be apprehended and read as the deeper and more permanent constitutive structure in which the empirical textual objects know intelligibility.
[ . . . ]
. . . I will suggest that within this final horizon the individual text or cultural artifact (with its appearance of autonomy which was dissolved in specific and original ways within the first two horizons as well) is here restructured as a field of force in which the dynamics of sign systems of several distinct modes of production can be registered and apprehended. These dynamics--the newly constituted "text" of our third horizon--make up what can be termed the ideology of form, that is, the determinate contradiction of the specific messages emitted by the varied sign systems which coexist in a given artistic process as well as in its general social formation.
What must now be stressed is that at this level "form" is apprehended
as content. . . . The simplest and most accessible demonstration
of this reversal may be found in the area of literary genre. Our
next chapter, indeed, will model the process whereby generic specification
and description can, in a given historical text, be transformed into the
detection of a host of distinct generic messages--some of them objectified
survivals from older modes of cultural production, some anticipatory, but
all together projecting a formal conjuncture through which the "conjuncture"
of coexisting modes of production at a given historical moment can be detected
and allegorically articulated.
2. This is to my mind the relevance of a theory
of "modes of production" for literary and cultural criticism; see, for
further reflections on this issue and a more explicit statement on the
"historicist" tendencies of Marxism, my "Marxism and
Historicism," New Literary History, II (Autumn, 1979), 41-73.
3. "The realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is in fact determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized men, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis." Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1977), III, 820.
4. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," in K. Marx, On Revolution, ed. and trans. S. K. Padover (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 81.
5. See Michel Foucault, "The Retreat and Return of the
Origin," chap. 9, part 6, of The Order of Things (New York: Vintage,
1973), pp. 328-335; as well as the same author's Archeology of Knowledge,
trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York:
Pantheon, 1972), in particular, the introduction and the chapter on the "history of ideas"; Jacques Derrida, "The Exorbitant. Question of Method," in Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 157-164; as well as his "Hers livre," In La Dissemination (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp. 9-67; Jean Baudrillard, "Vers une critique de l'economie politique du signe," in Pour une critique de l'economie politique du signe (Paris: Gallimard, 1972); along with his Mirror of Production, trans. Mark Poster (St. Louis: Telos, 1975); Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, The Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 25-28, 109-113, 305-308; Jean-Francois Lyotard, Economie libidinale (Paris: Minuit, 1974), especially "Le Desir nomme Marx," pp. 117-188; and last but not least, Louis Althusser, et al., Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970), especially "Marx's Immense Theoretical Revolution," pp. 182-193.
6. Deleuze/Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 109.
7. From the present perspective, in other words, Deleuze
and Guattari's proposal for an antiinterpretive method (which they
call schizo-analysis) can equally well be grasped as a new hermeneutic
in its own right. It is striking and noteworthy that most of the antiinterpretive
positions enumerated in note 5 above have felt the need to project new
"methods" of this kind: thus, the archeology of knowledge, but also,
more recently, the "political technology
of the body" (Foucault), "grammatology" and deconstruction
(Derrida), "symbolic exchange" (Baudrillard), libidinal economy (Lyotard),
and "semanalyse" (Julia Kristeva).
56. A useful discussion of the phenomenological concept of "horizon" may be found in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 216-220, 267 274. It will become clear in the
course of my subsequent discussion that a ~larxian conception of our relationship to the past requires a sense of our radical difference from earlier cultures which is not adequately allowed for in Gadamer's influential notion of Horizontverschmelzung
(fusion of horizons). This is perhaps also the moment to add that from the perspective of Marxism as an "absolute historicism," the stark antithesis proposed by E. D. Hirsch, Jr., between Cadamer's historicist "relativism" and Hirsch's own conception
of a more absolute Interpretive validity, will no longer seem particularly irreconcilable. Hirsch's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, between the scientific analysis of a text's intrinsic "meaning" and what he is pleased to call our "ethical"
evaluation of its "significance" for us (see, for example, The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976]), corresponds to the traditional Marxist distinction between science and ideology, particularly as it has been retheorized
by the Althusserians. It is surely a useful working distinction, although in the light of current revisions of the idea of science one should probably make no larger theoretical claims for it than this operative one.
57. Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology,
trans. C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf (New York: Basic, 1963),
pp. 206-231. The later four-volume Mythologiques reverse the perspective
of this analysis: where the earlier essay focused on the individual mythic
parole or utterance, the later series models the entire system or
langue in terms of which the various individual myths are related
to each other. Mythologiques should therefore rather be used as
suggestive material on the
historical difference between the narrative mode of production of primitive societies and that of our own: in this sense, the later work would find its place in the third and final horizon of interpretation.
58. Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes tropiques, trans. John Russell (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 176.
60. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 5-6; and see also my "Symbolic Inference; or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis," Critical Inquiry, 4 (Spring, 1978), 507-523.
61. See Chapter 3, note 13, and above, pp. 46-49.
62. Marxism and Form, pp. 376-382; and see below, pp. 288-291. The most authoritative contemporary Marxist statement of this view of social class is to be found in E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Classes (New York: Vintage, 1966), pp. 9-11; in The Poverty of Theory, Thompson has argued that his view of classes is incompatible with "structural" Marxism, for which classes are not "subjects" but rather "positions" within the social totality (see, for the Althusserian position, Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes).
63. Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems Of Dostoyevsky's Poetics, trans. R. W. Rotsel (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1973), pp. 153-169. See also Bakhtin's important book on linguistics, written under the name of V. N. Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. L. Matejka and I. R. Titunik (New York: Seminar Press, 1973), pp. 83-98; and Bakhtin's posthumous collection, Esthetique et theorie du roman, trans. Daria Olivier (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), esp. pp. 152-182.
64. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (London: Temple Smith, 1972).
65. Ernst Bloch, "Zerstorung, Rettung des Mythos durch Licht," in Verfremdungen I (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1963), pp. 152-162.
66. Eugene Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll (New York: Vintage, 1976), pp. 161-284.
67. The "classical" texts on modes of production, besides Lewis Henry Morgan's Ancient Society (1877), are Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, a section of the Grundrisse (1857-58) published separately by Eric Hobsbawm (New York: International, 1965), and Friedrich Engels, The Family, Private Property, and the State (1884). Important recent contributions to the mode of production "debate" include Etienne Balibar's contribution to Althusser's collective volume, Reading Capital; Emmanuel Terray, Marxism and "Primitive" Societies, trans. M. Klopper (New York: Monthly Review, 1972); Maurice Godelier, Horizon: trajets marxistes en anthropologie (Paris: Maspero, 1973); J. Chesneaux, ed., Sur le "mode de production asiatique" (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969); and Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).